Epidemic cyber incidents are caused by malicious websites using exploit kits. The exploit kit facilitate attackers to perform the drive-by download (DBD) attack. However, it is reported that malicious websites using an exploit kit have similarity in their website structure (WS)-trees. Hence, malicious website identification techniques leveraging WStrees have been studied, where the WS-trees can be estimated from HTTP traffic data. Nevertheless, the defensive component of the exploit kit prevents us from capturing the WS-tree perfectly. This paper shows, hence, a new WS-tree construction procedure by using the fact that a DBD attack happens in a certain duration. This paper proposes, moreover, a new malicious website identification technique by clustering the WS-tree of the exploit kits. Experiment results assuming the D3M dataset verify that the proposed technique identifies exploit kits with a reasonable accuracy even when HTTP traffic from the malicious sites are partially lost.
Introduction
Malicious websites are severe cyber threats because they spread malwares. The malicious websites exploit vulnerabilities in web browsers and their plugins and perform driveby download (DBD) attacks. DBD attacks start in users host as a background process. Figure 1 illustrates a DBD attack. The DBD attack is performed by landing, intermediate, exploit host and malware distribution host. The landing host is a compromised website and redirects a victim to intermediate host. The intermediate host identifies victim's system environment. The exploit host exploits vulnerabilities in the victim's system, which makes the victim automatically download and execute a malware via the malware distribution host.
For the DBD attacks, we have utilized blacklists to avoid or stop accessing to the path of DBD attacks. How- ever, the blacklists must be updated frequently since URLs of the malicious websites emerge and disappear in a short duration. Akiyama et al. [1] proposed a method to improve blacklists by searching neighborhood of the URLs. Mamun et al. [2] performed lexical analysis of the URLs by machine learning algorithms. These methods can detect malicious websites by finding similarity is the URL strings. However, the URL can be completely different depending on the visited host if each phase in the DBD attack is composed of multiple hosts as mentioned in [3] . Thus, detection methods using one URL do not always succeed.
It is reported that massive malicious websites are generated from specific exploit kits (e.g., [4] ). An exploit kit has JavaScripts and management tools so that attackers can easily arm and update their weapons flexibly. The malicious websites can, moreover, use obfuscation codes and/or can change their behavior according to victims' browsers.
Malicious website detection techniques are, hence, necessary to cope with such the clever attacks. For example, detection methods focusing on the attack-codes have been studied. Kolbitsch et al. [5] proposed a greedy inspection technique for malicious websites by executing suspicious JavaScripts on all possible platforms. Takata et al. [6] proposed a URL extracting technique by constructing abstract syntax trees and analyzing them. Kim et al. [7] proposed a detection method by applying the strength analysis for obfuscated JavaScripts. Nevertheless, the website analysis methods only using HTTP contents do not perfectly detect all malicious sites, since attackers can also camouflage attack-codes as to avoid the defense strategies.
We can improve detection techniques by leveraging structure in traffic data. This is because some invariants are assumed to be left behind in the communicated protocols transmitted from a specific exploit kit. Under the assumption, Mekky et al. [8] analyzed HTTP redirection Copyright c 2019 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers graphs of the malicious sites by using machine learning algorithms. Stringhihni et al. [9] also investigated malicious HTTP redirection graphs from extensively collected web surfing datasets. HTTP redirections are, however, marked by HTTP header and/or HTTP contents. Thus, these methods are also difficult to cope with the camouflage problem.
As an advanced detection technique, Zhang et al. [3] took an approach by constructing trees of attack hosts from their URL's hierarchical structure. The method extracts common features between malicious websites by generating signature from a malicious central host. Since DBD attacks can have multiple hosts, the analysis assuming a single host is also difficult to capture the behavior of the malicious websites.
The above researches aim to classify an HTTP flow into benign or not. When an incident caused by malicious web sites occurred in organizations, system administrator and security personnel shall investigate in which environment the incidents occurred, what client was redirected, and what vulnerability was exploited in order to understand the cause and damage. After the HTTP flow classification, understanding behavior of website from malicious HTTP flow is necessary in order to early recover or to minimize the damage.
Under the aim of understanding website behavior, we propose a new exploit kit identification method by using all URLs which belong to DBD attack hosts. It should be emphasized that our method is feasible even if a part of HTTP redirection data has lost, since it only utilizes URL lists accessed from a user. Our method can identify exploit kits by clustering the malicious website structures. Effectiveness of the proposed method is evaluated by using D3M dataset [10] . This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the background of this study. Section 3 proposes the new malicious website identification method. Section 4 presents experiment results to show effectiveness of the proposed method. We conclude the paper in Sect. 5.
Related Work about Exploit Kit

Exploit Kit's Components
Kotov et al. [11] showed typical components of exploit kits based on the source codes analysis of 30 exploit kits. Maio et al. [12] also analyzed the source codes of exploit kits and reported behavior of exploit kit at the server side. According to [11] and [12] , exploit kits have the following four components:
Offensive Component that attacks vulnerable machines according to user's environments identified from the user-agent and/or the accept-language in the HTTP protocol. Defensive Component that performs the IP blocking for multiple-visit users in order to avoid detection by malware scanners.
Management Component which facilitates attackers to install the exploit kit and provides control and monitor functionality of the attack activities. Protection Mechanisms which prevent from reverseengineering by obfuscating themselves, since the exploit kits are sharewares.
Related Work
We note that ordinary attackers are difficult to change the protected codes. Thus, the websites using the same exploit kit are assumed to have similarity although they are customized by the management component. Under the assumption, detection techniques have been studied by investigating features in a) the attack codes, b) the URLs, or c) the web session trees of the malicious websites: a) Stoke et al. [13] generates a signature to identify exploit kits from keyword, identifier, string and delimiter by parsing tokens in the JavaScripts. Luo et al. [14] proposed a clustering method by abstracting JavaScript codes. The method identifies the type of exploit kits and the obfuscator version. Although these methods can be performed without actually executing of JavaScript codes, the identification performance is not always guaranteed for polymorphic attack codes [13] .
b) Machine learning approaches [15] , [16] can be utilized to identify whether a URL was generated by an exploit kit. However, the approaches simply inspecting a single URL can fail to detect the malicious websites, since the defensive component can abort the redirection for machines which they recognize no-targeted user environment. It should be noticed that, moreover, a complete URL sequence accessed during a DBD attack is required to capture all the URL redirections correctly. c) Taylor et al. [17] proposed a detection method by using web session tree generated from web requests. The method identifies malicious websites by comparing the web session trees of suspicious sites with that of known exploit kits. However, in practice, we can observe the subtrees of web session trees only. This is because the redirection information cannot always be obtained perfectly due to the defensive component.
Website Structure Tree
This subsection reviews the conventional technique to describe a web session tree, where this paper refers the tree as website structure (WS)-tree. The structure of a DBD attacksite can be obtained from HTTP traffic data by finding redirection events. Specifically, we can obtain URLs used in the DBD attack by searching Referer and Location properties. Figure 2 shows an example URLs used for a DBD attack, where dashed arrows indicate redirection events. As depicted in Fig. 2 , the URL sequence has a tree structure, where the top-most "/" is the root node. A URL can be delimited by the slash character ("/"), where the first strings denote the host part linked to the root node. The rests are Fig. 2 Example of WS-tree the path part. The WS-tree can be utilized to identify websites. As above-mentioned, however, what we can observe is, practically, a subtree of that shown in Fig. 2 , since the defensive component can obscure the Referer and Location properties.
Our Approach
Therefore, we propose a new malicious website identification technique which can properly handle incomplete redirection information observed in traffic data from attacksites. Figure 3 shows overview of the proposed method. The method is composed of clustering and identification phases. In the clustering phase, first of all, we describe structure of malicious websites captured in training dataset, where the labels of exploit kits are determined by leveraging known CVE reports, etc. We perform, then, a hierarchical clustering algorithm for the WS-trees. In the identification phase, we identify labels of the exploit kits for estimated WS-tree of unknown malicious websites in test data.
Constructing WS-Tree
As discussed in Sect. 2, we can detect events of suspected DBD attacks by utilizing the WS-tree. However, the defensive component may prevent from capturing the redirection events correctly. The dynamic analysis approaches [8] , [17] can compensate for the missing observations. Unlike the conventional approaches, we notice that a series of URL accesses incurred by the DBD attack happens in a certain duration. This subsection, hence, proposes a new WS-tree construction procedure, after defining observed-and effectiveperiods for a WS-tree representing a DBD attack activity.
Definition: Observed-period of a WS-tree is defined by the minimum and maximum time-stamps accessed to the URLs corresponding to leaf nodes of a WS-tree.
Definition: Effective-period of a WS-tree is duration that added a certain margin to the observed-period.
WS-tree construction procedure is shown in Fig. 4 . Note that by Step 2 and 3, we can estimate the WS-tree for websites that are potentially used for a DBD attack. Even if the redirection information is lost partially, our technique Table 1 Number of sites constructed from D3M dataset by exploit kit can identify the malicious websites by performing the following clustering algorithm.
Comparing WS-Tree
We defined distance between two WS-trees T a and T b as:
where |T | is the number of nodes in tree T . The function T ED(T a , T b ) is the tree edit distance [17] between trees T a and T b . The tree edit distance is the minimum of the sum of costs for the insertion, deletion, and substitution operations required to transform T a from T b . We may set all the operation costs at 1. By definition, D s (T a , T b ) takes value 
Clustering
The proposed technique utilizes the hierarchical agglomerative clustering with average linkage method. We initialize clusters as to have one WS-tree. We iteratively merge clusters into the closest cluster according to the cost function:
holds for a threshold D th . The notation |C| is the number of WStrees in cluster C. We labeled the each cluster with exploit kit which the website in the cluster used.
Classifier
The classifier outputs a label of the identified exploit kit for an unknown WS-tree T u . Specifically, the label is determined by argmin i D c (T u , C i ) for ∀i.
Evaluation
We have implemented our method and evaluated it using a communication dataset. The following sections describe the experimental setup and evaluation results.
Experiment Setup
The D3M2010∼2015 dataset [10] is utilized to verify the effectiveness of the proposed technique. The D3M dataset contains DBD attacks and the malware traffic data collected by Marionette which is a high-interaction client honeypot. The traffic of DBD attacks is extracted by using a Ruby's HTTP parser library called packetfu. The corrupted packets for which packetfu does not accept are excluded from the input. The WS-trees are estimated by performing the procedure shown in Sect. 3.1, where the margin time of the effective-period of WS-tree is set at 60 seconds † . In this experiment, the WS-trees are labeled as any of 10 exploit kits: Eleonore, Seo, Cry217, Fragus BLK, CrimePack, Phoenix, BlackHole, Bleeding Life, and two unknown exploit kits. According to our clustering method, the D3M dataset includes 256 malicious websites. Table 1 shows the details of the sites constructed by the exploit kits. Moreover, Fig. 5 depicts examples of the WS-trees.
We perform 2-fold cross-validation (CV) by randomly choosing 206 training and 50 test data. In the training phase, we perform clustering for the 206 sites after obtaining the WS-trees. In the test phase, as shown in Sect. 3.4, the classifier identifies unknown 50 test data. Table 2 shows a confusion matrix obtained from the 10 CVs. The threshold D th is set at 0.5 in order to maximize the purity which is a performance measure of clustering.
Results
The Y-axis represents the real labels of the exploit kits, whereas the X-axis shows the identified kits by the classifier. The average accuracy is 86.2%. It should be emphasized that, as observed from Table 2 , the proposed technique achieves the accuracy more than 90% for the exploit kits such as {Eleonore, Seo, BlackHole, Phoenix, Bleeding Life, CrimePack} that follow our assumption. Figure 6 shows the WS-tree of Eleonore that the proposed technique identifies successfully. As shown in Fig. 6 , the WS-tree of Eleonore is composed of two clusters. In the first cluster, the attack-codes exploit ActiveX vulnerability, where the websites have 432.js and load.php and perform 5734.js finally. In the second cluster, a vulnerability of Java is exploited, where the websites have dx ds.gif exploiting CVE 2008-0015 and the downloader getexe.php. † We experimentally find that the DBD attacks observed in the D3M dataset are executed in 60 seconds at most. Some of them redirect executable files. As shown in above of Fig. 6 , no redirection between different hosts is observed. It should be noted that, hence, our method can identify malicious websites even if URLs and/or redirection information are partially lost due to the protection component of the ex- Fig. 6 Example of WS-tree succeeded in identification using Eleonore exploit kit ploit kits. Figure 7 shows the WS-trees that the proposed method failed in identifying of Bleeding Life. Bleeding Life has some behavior like Eleonore's case. The failed case is caused by the fact that the WS-trees in training dataset do not have some nodes related to jQuery library even though the WS-trees in the test dataset have many nodes generated by loading jQuery library. As shown above, if training dataset do not have a WS-tree which is similar structure to unknown WS-tree, the proposed method cannot identify unknown WS-tree as known exploit kit. If a new exploit kit arises, it is expected to identify it by re-training the dataset so as to include it. This is a limitation of the proposed method. Fig. 8 (a) is divided into the three parts shown in Fig. 8 (c) . This observation verifies that the proposed method captures structural feature more accurately than the conventional technique.
Conclusions
This paper has proposed a novel malicious website identification technique by clustering the WS-trees of exploit kits. Under the fact that a DBD attack happens in a certain duration, the proposed method can estimate the WS-tree even if the HTTP traffic data from a malicious website is partially lost. According to the experiment results shown in this paper, the proposed technique achieves a reasonable identification accuracy of 86.2% for the D3M dataset. Moreover, this paper showed WS-trees of actual 10 exploit kits. We plan to conduct evaluation for the exploit kit raised after 2015 to the proposed method. Future work of this study is, based on the WS-tree analysis, to improve identification performance further.
